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ABSTRACT. This article argues for dissolving the civic–ethnic dichotomy into
several analytical dimensions and suggests ‘autochthony’ and ‘activism’ as two such
alternatives. It does so by ﬁrst presenting a case study of Irish language revivalism and
identity discourses in the North of Ireland, in which locals turn out to be both ‘civic’
nationalists and ‘ethno’-cultural revivalists. The article then advocates treating these
aspects as belonging to two distinct dimensions: the ﬁrst is concerned with the causal
logic underlying the reproduction of nationhood in terms of autochthony, while the
second speciﬁes different forms of activism aimed at (re)constituting the nation.
Finally, reinterpreting the empirical case in terms of these two dimensions, it is shown
that the type of activism is dependent on the speciﬁcities of ‘threats’ to the nation
rather than on the underlying type of autochthony, which further substantiates the
necessity to disambiguate the civic–ethnic distinction.
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Introduction
Within the study of nationalism, there is a long history of analysing empirical
cases of nationhood and national identity according to basic classiﬁcations.
While some authors have developed quite elaborate typologies (e.g. Smith in
his Theories of Nationalism, 1983: 211–29), most have been content with using
one of several root dichotomies such as ‘political–cultural,’ ‘liberal–illiberal,’
or ‘universalistic–particularistic.’ Moving back in time, the genealogy of such
dichotomies notably includes an early distinction between ‘voluntarist’ and
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‘organic’ nationalisms in the late nineteenth century (Smith 2001: 36);
Meinecke’s (1919) opposition between the largely passive Kulturnation and
the politically active Staatsnation; and – most prominently perhaps – Kohn’s
(1944) argument around the mid-twentieth century, contrasting ‘Western’
with ‘Eastern’ nationalism.
Kohn’s basic distinction has proven highly inﬂuential within studies of
nationalism. In recent years, the dichotomy has gained further prominence
through a terminological distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalism.
As Smith put it, the ‘civic’ or Western model is hereby ‘predominantly a
spatial or territorial conception’, whereas the distinguishing feature of the
‘ethnic’ or non-Western nation is ‘its emphasis on a community of birth and
native culture’ (Smith 1991: 9, 11). Within this framework, civic nationalism
has typically been positively valued as inclusive, whereas ethnic nationalism
has largely been negatively valued as exclusive.
Such broad and fundamental conceptions of nationalisms – ‘Eastern’ and
‘Western’, ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ – have not been without their critics. Kohn’s
regionalism has been widely criticised for its reductionism and neo-orientalist
undertones (Spencer and Wollman 2005: 200). Thus, it has become a main-
stream position within nationalism studies to regard ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’
primarily as ideal-type positions and to analyse all concrete cases of
nationalism as containing both ‘civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees
and different forms. Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at
other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasized’
(Smith 1991: 13).
Despite these more nuanced usages of the civic–ethnic divide, several
observers have nevertheless highlighted the inherent ambiguities of this master
dichotomy. According to Brubaker (2004: 136–40), the civic–ethnic distinc-
tion is analytically ambiguous in that both terms can be deﬁned either broadly
or narrowly, leading to fundamental problems in the concrete application of
the dichotomy. Brubaker (2004: 140–44) further shows the civic–ethnic
distinction to be also haunted by normative ambiguities. As has already
been mentioned, ‘civic’ nationalism has been typically seen as positively
inclusive, whereas ‘ethnic’ nationalism has been criticised for being danger-
ously exclusive. Yet, apart from highlighting that inclusion is not inherently
positive, Brubaker (2004: 141) aptly states that ‘in fact all understandings of
nationhood and all forms of nationalism are simultaneously inclusive and
exclusive. What varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or
exclusiveness, but the bases or criteria of inclusion and exclusion.’ Against this
backdrop, Brubaker argues for the dissolution of the civic–ethnic dichotomy
and suggests, as a modest alternative, a distinction between ‘state-framed’ and
‘counter-state’ understandings of nationhood.
In this article, I follow this line of argumentation, which insists on the
necessity of replacing the single, ambiguous, and overloaded civic–ethnic
divide with several analytical dimensions. Based on a case study of language
revivalism and identity discourses among Irish nationalists, I suggest that the
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two dimensions of ‘autochthony’ and ‘activism’ yield better understandings of 
nationalism. This argument proceeds in three steps: Initially, based on 
ethnographic ﬁeldwork, the case of Irish language activists in Catholic West 
Belfast is presented. The range of language practices is characterised as are 
representations of the language itself. As it turns out, many locals see Irish as 
a crucial element of their ‘Irish culture’ in need of being repossessed. When 
talking about their Irishness, however, the same actors tend to emphasise 
‘being born in Ireland’ rather than ‘Irish culture’ as the deﬁning criterion, 
explicitly including Protestants. Framed in civic–ethnic terms, locals thus 
seem to be both ‘civic’ nationalists and ‘ethno’-cultural revivalists.
Yet instead of interpreting this case as incorporating ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ 
elements within a single dimension, I treat these aspects as belonging to two 
distinct dimensions. The ﬁrst is concerned with the causal logic underlying the 
reproduction of nationhood in terms of ‘autochthony’ – i.e. the proclaimed 
‘original’ link between an individual, territory, and group. The dichotomy 
within this dimension is based on different causal trajectories through which 
the same elements are linked: ‘individualised autochthony’ sees shared culture 
and/or descent as a likely consequence of place of birth and/or residence, 
while ‘collectivised autochthony’ inverts this causality. The second dimension 
contrasts ‘political’ with ‘cultural activism’, with the former referring to 
practices (re)constituting the nation as politically autonomous and the latter 
as culturally distinctive.
In a ﬁnal step, I reinterpret the empirical case using these new dimensions 
of ‘autochthony’ and ‘activism’. As is shown with regard to the ‘cultural 
activism’ of ‘individualised-autochthonous’ nationalists in Catholic West 
Belfast, the type and extent of activism is actually independent from the 
underlying type of autochthony, but contingent on the ways in which the 
nation is contested. Thus it is shown how framing this empirical case in terms 
of the single civic–ethnic divide would not sensitise the observer to such 
interdependencies, which easily go unnoticed because of the master dichot-
omy’s misleading equation of ‘civic’ with ‘the political’ and ‘ethnic’ with ‘the 
cultural’. This substantiates the need to disambiguate the civic–ethnic dis-
tinction into several analytical dimensions.
Language revivalism and discourses on Irishness in the North of Ireland
Despite fundamental changes in recent years, society in the North of Ireland 
still remains divided along nearly co-extensive lines of religious, ethnic, and 
political self-ascriptions, ensuring that – as all generally available public 
opinion data persistently show (Coakley 2007; Trew 1998) – most Catholics 
see themselves as Irish and politically subscribe to the Nationalist/Republican 
agenda of uniting Ireland, whereas most Protestants identify themselves as 
British and, as Unionists/Loyalists, wish to maintain ‘the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (Coulter 1999: 10–22; Zenker 2006).2 In
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cities like Belfast, this social divide is manifested in considerable residential
segregation (Doherty and Poole 2000: 189). This particularly applies to West
Belfast, where I did fourteen months of ﬁeldwork in 2003 and 2004 on the
relationship between the Irish language and identity.3 This part of the city
consists of two areas – a Protestant one to the north and a larger Catholic area
to the south – that are largely physically divided by so-called ‘peace lines’
across which interaction continues to be limited. It is hence not surprising that
almost all of my informants in Catholic West Belfast came only from the Irish
Nationalist/Republican community.
Within the conﬁnes of Catholic West Belfast, the Irish language has
recently experienced a remarkable revival. Irish belongs to a group of six
Celtic languages. Although as a Celtic language, Irish is part of the Indo-
European family of languages, it is only distantly related to the Germanic
branch of which English is a part (Hindley 1990: 3; Murchu´ 2000: 3; Price
2000; Schrijver 2000). Historically, over the course of Ireland’s long colonial
history and especially in the nineteenth century, the prevailing language, Irish,
was increasingly replaced by English. Despite the continued existence of the
‘Gaeltacht’ – that is, small areas inhabited by native Irish speakers along the
west coast – the Irish language continues to be threatened with extinction.
Although since the late nineteenth century the ‘death of the Irish language’
(Hindley 1990) has been slowed, it has not been reversed, notwithstanding the
attempts of several cultural revival movements (Hutchinson 1987; Murchu´
2000; Purdon 1999).
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the Irish language was no longer signiﬁcantly
practiced in Catholic West Belfast throughout the ﬁrst half of the twentieth
century. Yet as historical sources, my own ﬁeldwork material, as well as the
historiographical4 and ethnographical5 literature show, this situation changed
considerably from the 1950s onwards, when a local language revival began to
gain momentum. While grossly simplifying the underlying dynamics, it can be
said that this success has been mainly due to two factors: ﬁrst, the establish-
ment of a quite effective language supply by a small circle of committed
language activists; and second, increasing local demand for practising the
language, a demand that in complex ways has been stimulated by the
‘Troubles’, that is, the recent political conﬂict.
During the 1960s, a group of language enthusiasts founded Ireland’s ﬁrst
urban Gaeltacht in Catholic West Belfast, where Irish has been spoken as the
everyday language ever since. This establishment of a small Gaeltacht
neighbourhood proved particularly consequential because it gave the lan-
guage a permanent location from which further initiatives could develop
(Maguire 1991; Nig Uidhir 2006). As families in this neighbourhood raised
their children with Irish as their ﬁrst language, Irish-medium education
became the next pressing issue. These same Irish speakers thus also founded
and ran the ﬁrst Irish-medium school in the North of Ireland despite the
disapproval of educational authorities, who for more than a decade refused to
support the school ﬁnancially. Initially the school catered only for children
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from the immediate community, but soon it was also opened to pupils from 
surrounding neighbourhoods who had acquired some Irish while attending a 
language-immersion nursery that had also been established within the urban 
Gaeltacht. The Irish-medium school and nursery were later to function as 
‘blueprints’ for many other educational institutions throughout the entire 
North of Ireland (Mac Corraidh 2006). Within the wider networks of these 
activists, additional language initiatives appeared, including the foundation of 
a local Irish-language centre in 1991, which has since provided a focal point 
for local Irish-medium interactions.
Corresponding to this expanding infrastructure of language supply, there 
has also been a growing demand for Irish-language activities. Beginning in the 
1970s, thousands of locals started learning Irish in informal evening classes, 
which began to proliferate in social clubs, schools, pubs, parish halls, and 
private houses in Catholic West Belfast. Others learned the language during 
increasingly long terms of imprisonment (Kachuk 1993: 152–8; O’Reilly 1999: 
17–31; Feldman 1991: 204–45). From the 1980s onwards, many Republicans 
within the IRA and its political wing, Sinn Fe´ in, who had hitherto not 
ascribed much importance to the Irish language also began to promote it 
(McKeown 2001). In addition, increasing numbers of parents sought Irish-
medium schools for their children, and such demand spurred the founding of 
ever more Irish-medium schools. Especially since the 1990s, this has led to an 
explosion of Irish-medium education. Together, all of these factors have led to 
a dramatic increase in the actual practice of the Irish language within Catholic 
West Belfast and beyond.
Against this background of local language practice, I now want to turn to 
representations of the Irish language. During my ﬁeldwork, I discerned three 
basic positions regarding Irish among local Irish speakers (see also Kachuk 
1993 and especially O’Reilly 1997, 1999). A small group consisting mainly of 
language lobbyists has articulated a rights-based approach, depicting the Irish 
language as an issue of ‘human’, ‘civil’ and/or ‘minority rights’ that is above 
narrow political concerns such as the constitutional status of the North of 
Ireland. From this perspective, the language is sometimes viewed as a precious 
yet endangered object of culture. It is important to note, however, that in this 
context the term ‘culture’ is used to refer not to a distinctive ‘national culture’ 
typically associated with Irishness (as in the following two positions) but to an 
overarching ‘human culture’, the diversity of which must be protected as an 
end in itself through a kind of cultural environmentalism. In contrast, for 
those holding the second, ‘culturalist’ position, Irish represents a fundamental 
yet largely lost element of their own ‘Irish culture and identity’. However, 
culturalists argue for a strict separation between issues related to the Irish 
language and the politics of unifying Ireland. These actors therefore have 
tended to be suspicious of any public ‘performances’ of the Irish language by 
Republican politicians, whom they have accused of ‘hijacking’ the language, 
abusing it as a mere means to their ultimately political ends. Those associated 
with a third, ‘politicist’ position share with culturalists the conviction that the
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Irish language is an important element of Irishness, which must reappro-
priated. Yet ‘politicists’ reject the suggestion that they (or their allies) have
‘hijacked’ the language, arguing that by speaking Irish one already is and
should be engaged in the political struggle for decolonising Ireland and, thus,
liberating it from its external British oppressors.
Despite some important differences, the culturalist and politicist positions
– which, to my knowledge, prevail locally – have one important feature in
common, namely the representation of the Irish language as a crucial element
of their own ‘Irish culture’ in need of repossession. This notion of Irish as ‘our
own native language’, which I encountered again and again in conversations
with locals, seems to have become both widespread and relevant in Catholic
West Belfast only since the 1970s, although the close link between Irish and
Irishness was propagated in Nationalist discourses as far back as the nine-
teenth century (Andrews 2000a, 2000b; Hindley 1990: 21–42; Hutchinson
1987; Kachuk 1993: 112–51; O’Reilly 1999: 32–48). While culturalist and
politicist Irish speakers have hence been united in clearly pursuing their local
language activism in Catholic West Belfast as ‘ethno’-cultural revivalists, it is
interesting to observe that, when discussing their Irish identity, these same
actors actually turn out to be far less ‘ethnic’ than scholars attuned to the
civic–ethnic divide might expect.
When conversing with locals about their Irishness, I frequently came across
a set of three basic components of this identity. Take, for instance, Mary,6 a
woman in her ﬁfties, born and raised in a Republican family in Catholic West
Belfast, whom I regularly met in the course of Irish-language classes. When we
talked about her sense of identity, Mary echoed my question, replying, ‘What
makes somebody Irish? Being born in Ireland, being part of the Irish culture.
Just that they always identify themselves as Irish and never ever as British.’7
This short extract nicely sums up the three core components of local Irishness,
namely ‘being born in Ireland’, ‘being part of Irish culture’, and ﬁnally one’s
own self-identiﬁcation as being Irish.
Among these aspects, ‘being born in Ireland’ is usually the ﬁrst thing that
comes to people’s minds. So, for instance, Robert, a sixty-three-year-old
Catholic, immediately responded, ‘Basically, if you are born in Ireland.’8
Equally, forty-seven-year-old Martina emphasised that she ‘was born here’,
when asked why she was Irish. In explaining what she meant by ‘here,’ she
said: ‘In Ireland. I don’t class myself as British because I happen to be born
this side of the border. It all comes down to, I think, what is on the map: on
the island of Ireland.’9 This illustrates what, to my knowledge, is a largely
uniform pattern in Catholic West Belfast: ‘Ireland’ is construed in Catholics’
geography of national identity as the whole of the island of Ireland; it is the
seemingly self-evident natural givenness of a geographical unity to which their
sense of place of birth refers rather than to political units on the island, which
are seen as artiﬁcial.
The notion of ‘being born in Ireland’ thus provides a discourse of inclusion
for both children of immigrants and for local Protestants under the common
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denominator of Irishness. However, Mary’s second aspect of Irishness – 
‘being part of Irish culture’ – seems to have rather excluding effects for 
descendants of immigrants and for Protestants in particular. ‘Irish culture’ is 
typically seen in Catholic West Belfast as comprising ‘Gaelic Games’ such as 
Gaelic Football, Hurling, or its female version, Camogie. It also encompasses 
forms of ‘Irish dancing’ and ‘Irish traditional music’ as well as the Irish 
language. What makes these things self-evidently ‘Irish’ was aptly summarised 
by one of my younger informants, a seventeen-year-old boy named Daithi: 
‘’Cause you wouldn’t ﬁnd it anywhere else in the world. ‘Cause you are not 
going to go to China and ﬁnd people playing Hurling.’10 ‘Irish culture’ is thus 
seen to consist of things that exist only in Ireland – or, to be more precise, that 
are seen as originating from or rightfully belonging to the Irish people, hence 
making the Irish people distinctive as Irish people. While many Catholics 
would stress that these elements of ‘Irish culture’ are not restricted to 
Catholics but also rightfully belong to local Protestants as fellow Irishmen, 
few would deny that ‘Irish culture’ – especially the Gaelic Games and the Irish 
language – is predominantly practised by Catholics. In practice, ‘Irish culture’ 
thus seems to exclude Protestants. However, a second look at the perceived 
relationship between practising ‘Irish culture’ and ‘the Irish people’ among 
Catholics reveals a much weaker connection.
Many Catholics, and especially those who are heavily involved in ‘Irish 
culture’, assert that they do not see ‘cultural’ practice as a precondition for 
being Irish. Take, for example, the following statement by Peadar, an Irish 
speaker in his thirties, who has been a language activist for his entire 
professional life:
I don’t want to be snobbish, but the ability to speak Irish surely reinforces one’s 
Irishness. But it is not a prerequisite to being Irish. Just because I speak Irish makes me 
not more Irish, but personally, I undoubtedly feel more Irish. Do I feel that others do 
need to speak Irish to be wholeheartedly Irish? Deﬁnitely not! I don’t see that as a 
contradiction. For me personally, to have the ability to speak Irish enriches my 
Irishness.11
This quotation reveals a very typical pattern of argumentation among 
Catholics: practical involvement with some form of ‘Irish culture’ is seen as 
making one personally feel ‘more Irish’, but such involvement is rejected as 
either ‘actually’ making one more Irish or as a general precondition of 
Irishness. On a personal level, practising ‘Irish culture’ may enrich one’s 
Irishness or, as many locals suggest, it may help reassure them of their own 
Irish identity in times of conﬂict, during which questions of identity become 
both salient and contested. Practising ‘Irish culture’ may be helpful as a 
‘decolonising weapon’ in demonstrating one’s own ‘cultural’ distinctiveness 
vis-a` -vis what is seen as an ethnically different oppressor; or it may be seen as 
something that Irish people should do in order to maintain a valuable and 
distinctive ‘culture’ under threat of destruction, with those Irish people who 
don’t seem to care being frowned upon. But such apathetic individuals remain 
‘Irish’ nevertheless; they are generally not seen as being ‘less Irish’ but only as
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(regrettably) less interested in ‘their own’ culture. In short, while the actual
practice of ‘Irish culture’ can potentially provide a basis for the exclusion of
Protestants from Irishness – something Protestants often emphasise – this is
usually not the point of view of local Catholics.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that many local Catholics insist
that Protestants are actually also Irish. This position was concisely expressed
by Sea´n, a sixteen-year-old pupil of the local Irish-medium secondary school,
when asked about the identity of local Protestants:
Protestants just have a different religion. It would be Unionists. Unionists claim to be
British and want to be part of the British Isles. They claim to be British. But I would
say: No, they are Irish. They were born in Ireland; they have an Irish background; their
parents were born in Ireland as well. They follow a different culture, but they are still
Irish.12
While Sea´n stresses that ethnic and political identiﬁcation rather than
religious background matters, and while he acknowledges that ‘Unionists’
follow a culture different from ‘Irish culture’, he nevertheless characterises
them as Irish because of their place of birth. Inclusion based on birth location
thus supersedes the potentially exclusionary element of ‘Irish cultural’ practice
in the ascription of Irishness. Yet this fairly widespread position sits uneasily
with the third aspect of Irishness, which Mary mentioned in the interview
quoted above, namely one’s self-identiﬁcation as Irish. In my experience, local
Catholics usually insist on the importance of this aspect for someone to
qualify as ‘Irish’. However, when it comes to Protestants, the latter tend to be
seen as Irish, whatever their own self-ascriptions. As I argue elsewhere, the
reason that many Catholics ultimately disregard Protestants’ right to self-
identify lies in the logics of local politics: the legitimacy of Nationalist and
Republican discourses has for long rested on the idea that ‘Protestants,
Catholics, and Dissenters’ are – or, to be more precise, have to be – fellow
Irishmen (Zenker 2006).
However, instead of further delving into this political dynamic here, it
should sufﬁce to note that when talking about their Irishness, local Catholics
tend to emphasise ‘being born in Ireland’ rather than self-identiﬁcation or
‘being part of Irish culture’ as the main deﬁning criterion. Framed in civic–
ethnic terms, locals are thus evidently ‘civic’ nationalists. In integrating both
the analyses of the language revival and of local discourses on Irishness, I am
hence tempted to conclude that most of my informants are actually ‘ethno’-
cultural revivalists as well as ‘civic’ nationalists. Yet if this is the case, if
‘ethno’-cultural revivalists are in fact ‘civic’ nationalists, what, then, remains
of the civic–ethnic divide?
‘Autochthony’ and ‘activism’ as analytic alternatives to the civic–ethnic divide
Instead of seeing this empirical case as simply comprising ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’
elements within a single dimension, I instead interpret the ‘civic’ nationalism
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and ‘ethno’-cultural revivalism of my informants as constituting two separate
phenomena, one related to different modes of ‘autochthony’ and the other to
varieties of ‘activism’.
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, the term ‘autochthon’ is
derived from the Greek autos (‘self’) and khthoˆn (‘earth’), literally meaning
‘sprung from the earth’; the word designates ‘an original or indigenous
inhabitant of a place’ (Soanes and Stevenson 2003: 107). Against this back-
drop, autochthony can be provisionally deﬁned as referring to a proclaimed
‘original’ link between an individual, territory, and group, which typically
presents itself as ‘self-evident’, ‘authentic’, ‘primordial’, and/or ‘natural.’13 In 
a recent literature review on the current upsurge of autochthony discourses in
Africa and Europe, Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005) observe that the closely
related term ‘indigenous peoples’ has gained a somewhat broader appeal,
especially since the establishment of the United Nations Working Group on
Indigenous Populations (1982). However, ‘indigenous peoples’ are usually
conceived of as marginalised ‘others’ in need of protection on ‘their own
lands’, whilst the ‘autochthon’ is typically conceived of as an ‘in-group’ in
need of protection from scrounging strangers – the ‘allochthons’ – who have
immigrated into ‘one’s own homeland’ (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005: 386).
Since the 1990s, ‘autochthony’ has become a violently contested issue in
many African countries. This development can be seen as an ‘unexpected
corollary’ of democratisation in the form of reintroduced multipartyism as
well as decentralised development policies that increasingly by-pass the state
(Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005: 385, 389–90; Bayart, Geschiere and Nyamn-
joh, 2001). Being a crucial mode within the new politics of belonging that has
emerged as the ﬂip-side of globalisation, autochthony discourses thereby take
various forms (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005; Geschiere and Jackson 2006).
As a fascinating new body of literature on various African and European
countries14 shows, autochthony is typically used as a means of specifying, with 
regard to the state, both which level within a segmentary identity structure is
the relevant one for a given context and which identity deﬁnition on that level
is appropriate. In some contexts autochthony thereby functions as an
alternative to national citizenship; in other settings, it operates rather as its
redeﬁnition.
As these observations suggest, this new ethnographic scholarship explicitly
addresses the relationship between autochthony and other forms of belonging
such as ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship. Yet it is interesting to note that
these texts typically engage with this relationship empirically rather than
conceptually. In other words, the authors often use terms such as ‘ethnic
groups’, ‘national citizenship’, or ‘the nation’ as conventional labels for
speciﬁc levels within a segmentary identity structure without sufﬁciently
addressing the question as to what analytically distinguishes these different
forms of belonging.15 In instances where the concept of autochthony is in 
some way speciﬁed, this is usually done ambiguously by, on the one hand,
characterising autochthony as ‘a new form of ethnicity’ equally capable of
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‘creating an us–them opposition’ and ‘arousing strong emotions regarding the
defense of home and of ancestral lands’ (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000: 424;
see also Ceuppens 2006: 151; Geschiere and Jackson 2006: 5–6). On the other
hand, autochthony is also represented as being different from ethnicity
(Ceuppens 2006: 149; Geschiere and Jackson 2006: 5–6), since the latter
term ‘evokes the existence of a more or less clearly deﬁned ethnic group with
its own substance and a speciﬁc name and history’, whereas autochthony is
‘empty’ – ‘an identity with no particular name and no speciﬁed history, only
expressing the claim to have come ﬁrst, which is always open to contest’
(Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005: 387).
These deﬁnitions by Geschiere and other authors seem to suggest that
autochthony should ultimately be treated as distinct from ethnicity. But a
second look at the above-mentioned empirical cases from Africa and
Europe shows that almost all described ‘autochthonous’ identities below
the level of (nation-)states actually do refer to named ethnic groups, which
not only have speciﬁable histories but in fact specify them (among others)
through claims of having been the ﬁrst in ‘their own territory’. Further-
more, even where the nation and its citizenry are reclassiﬁed through
autochthony on the state level, this smaller-scale redeﬁnition is typically
‘ethnic’, rather than ‘civic’ in nature. In fact, the replacement of ‘civic’
citizenship with a more restrictive ‘ethnic’ citizenship is usually the very
raison d’eˆtre for the evocation of a rhetoric of autochthony in the ﬁrst place.
In the end, this seems to suggest that, despite some proclamations to the
contrary, within this new ethnography of autochthony, it is usually the
‘ethnic’ that legitimises privileged access to land through autochthonous
ﬁrst-comer claims rooted in the past.
It is somewhat ironic that when comparing these observations with the
brieﬂy discussed civic–ethnic divide within studies of nationalism, it becomes
evident that both bodies of literature provide rather contradictory accounts as
to how identity formations literally ‘take place’: within studies of nationalism,
it is generally the ‘non-ethnic’ (‘the civic’) that is associated with territory
through place of birth and/or residence (the ‘ethnic’ being mainly linked to
descent and/or culture), whereas in research on autochthony, it is typically the
‘ethnic’ that interconnects the individual, territory, and group in such a way
that land rights follow from ﬁrst-comer claims linked to the past.
This article argues for a synthesis of insights from both ﬁelds by
conceptualising the root phenomenon of ‘autochthony’ in terms of the causal
logic that underlies the (re)production of nationhood. In this sense, ‘auto-
chthony’ can be seen as a triad in which its three components – ‘individual’,
‘territory’, and ‘group’ – are simultaneously situated in time and causally
linked through the interconnections of place of birth/residence, group
membership with land rights and shared culture/descent. Against this back-
drop, the previously mentioned differences between studies of nationalism, on
the one hand, and of autochthony, on the other, can be reinterpreted as
complementary in addressing two alternative modes of this very same causal
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Figure 1. Individualised autochthony.
logic – modes distinguished only by their respective causal directions and the
ways in which they handle time.
Within such an approach, ‘civic’ nationalism turns out to be based on
‘individualised autochthony’ in which an individual – through his or her place
of birth and/or residence – ﬁrst causally links up with a territory, which –
through land rights embedded in membership titles – is connected to a group,
which, in turn, is likely to link up again with the individual through the
possible though not necessary connection of a shared culture and/or descent
(see Figure 1). This type of autochthony is ‘individualised’ in the sense that the
proclaimed original link between an individual, territory, and group is
essentially produced through the ‘present continuous’ of individuals, i.e.
through their individual place of birth and/or residence in their respective
‘presents’. Commonality of place of birth and/or residence thereby simulta-
neously connects to and constitutes both ‘the territory’ and, then, ‘the group’.
Over time, this pattern is likely to ultimately also effect commonalities of
culture and/or descent among these individuals (unless, of course, these
individuals migrate or they are the progeny of migrant parents).
In contrast, cases typically characterised in terms of ‘ethnic’ nationalism
(or, in fact, ‘autochthony’) can be interpreted as based on another auto-
chthonous mode that inverts the causal direction of individualised auto-
chthony: within ‘collectivised autochthony’, an individual – through shared
culture and/or descent – ﬁrst causally links up with a group, which at some
point in its proclaimed past connected itself – through the establishment of
land rights for its members – to a territory, which now in the present is likely
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to link up again with the individual through the possible though not necessary
connection of placing birth and/or residence of this individual within its own
conﬁnes (see Figure 2). This mode of autochthony is ‘collectivised’ since the
proclaimed original link between an individual, territory, and group is
essentially established through the ‘passe´ simple’ of groups, distinguishing
between ‘ﬁrst-comers’ and ‘late-comers’ to that territory based on alleged
‘collective pasts’. Shared culture and/or descent serve as the necessary link for
an individual to be connected, ﬁrst, to the group and, then, to the territory,
but group, territory, and their interconnection are conceived of as being
independent from and prior to the individual. In many cases, this nexus is
likely to ultimately also cause the individual to be born and/or to reside within
the territory to which his or her community of culture and/or descent
proclaims entitlement. Yet this is not necessarily so – as the prototypical
case of diasporas illustrates.
This distinction between individualised and collectivised autochthony
avoids a certain ambiguity that is built into the civic–ethnic divide: on the
one hand, the ‘civic’ and the ‘ethnic’ are typically distinguished by different
ingredients. As, for instance, Smith indicated above, the ‘civic’ is typically a
‘territorial conception’, whilst the ‘ethnic’ instead emphasises the ‘community
of birth and native culture’ (Smith 1991: 9, 11). However, on the other hand,
only a few pages later, Smith (1991: 13–14) insists that both models also share
‘certain common beliefs about what constitutes a nation’ and goes on to
enumerate these common ingredients in a way that largely conﬂates the earlier
distinction between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nations. This ambiguity is dissolved
Figure 2. Collectivised autochthony.
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within the dichotomy of individualised and collectivised autochthony since 
this distinction is not based on ingredients but different causal directions in 
which the same elements are prototypically linked: individualised auto-
chthony sees shared culture and/or descent as likely consequences of place 
of birth and/or residence, while collectivised autochthony inverts this relation-
ship. In other words, no less than collectivised autochthons do, individualised 
autochthons typically envision a shared culture (and/or shared descent) within 
the territory of the nation. Both differ only in the causal logic they deploy to 
explain this coincidence. While shared culture (and/or descent) is the 
independent variable – the prerequisite of nationhood – for the collectivised 
autochthon, it is the likely but not necessary outcome for the individualised 
autochthon. This also means, however, that for both, ‘shared culture’ is not 
simply given but is either the independent cause of the nation (in collectivised 
autochthony) or a merely potential effect of the nation, about which one can 
never be sure (in individualised autochthony). As we will see, this turns 
‘cultural activism’ into a potential necessity for both the collectivised and the 
individualised autochthon.
Compared with the extensive discussion of ‘autochthony’, the establish-
ment of the second dimension – ‘activism’ – is much more straightforward. 
This dimension builds on the longstanding distinction between ‘political’ and 
‘cultural nationalism’, which was elaborated by Hutchinson (1987) in his 
seminal study on The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism in Ireland. Hutch-
inson investigates three waves of cultural revivals in terms of alternating cycles 
of ‘political’ and ‘cultural nationalisms’, which he interprets as distinctive 
phenomena. ‘Political nationalism’ builds on a rationalist conception that 
ultimately seeks to establish the political autonomy of the nation in the form 
of an independent, representative state with uniform citizenship rights for its 
members. In order to achieve this goal, political nationalists typically organise 
along legal-rational lines, forming centralised apparatuses, which mobilise 
different groups towards this unitary end. In contrast, ‘cultural nationalism’ is 
rooted in a historicist cosmology of humanity naturally divided into unique 
territorial communities each with its own laws of growth and decay. Based on 
this evolutionary vision, cultural nationalism is seen as ultimately aiming for 
‘the moral regeneration of the historic community, or, in other words, the re-
creation of their distinctive national civilization’ (Hutchinson 1987: 16). This 
type of nationalism propagates a return to the unique, though neglected, 
national culture as an inspirational means of establishing ‘authentic’ solutions 
for current problems. Typically, cultural nationalists thereby organise within 
informal and decentralised clusters of cultural societies, which only rarely 
transcend their character as minority phenomena.
Hutchinson’s discussion of the modern history of Irish nationalism is 
insightful and inspiring in many ways. Yet his analytical framework, estab-
lishing a distinction between ‘political’ and ‘cultural nationalism’ as the 
underlying master dichotomy, suffers from the same malaise as the civic–
ethnic divide in trying to solve too much at once. I thus contend that it is
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better to dissolve such master dichotomies into several analytical dimensions
that respectively focus on more restricted issues. In this vein, while reserving
the term ‘nationalism’ for the overall phenomenon, I argue for a much more
circumscribed analytical distinction under the heading of ‘activism’: ‘political
activism’ is then seen as ideal-typically referring to practices aimed at
(re)constituting the nation as politically (more) autonomous, while the
ideal-type of ‘cultural activism’ applies to practices aimed at the (re)constitu-
tion of the nation as culturally (more) distinctive.
It is clear that while certain practices might clearly fall into the realm of
either political or cultural activism, other activities can be both political and
cultural. However, one and the same practice may also lead to conﬂicts
between political and cultural activists. Hutchinson begins his book by
describing a crucial discussion at the 1909 National Convention of the United
Irish League about whether or not the Irish language should be made
compulsory for matriculation at the new National University. Cultural
activists argued in favour of such a policy while political activists were
opposed, believing that language was likely to divide rather than unite
Catholics and Protestants in a common striving for an independent state. A
hundred years later, the same controversy – about whether the Irish language
or the political cause should take precedence – continues to divide Irish
Nationalists in the North. It is to them that I now return.
Autochthony and activism among contemporary Irish Nationalists
As described above, virtually all of my informants within the language scene
in Catholic West Belfast gave priority to ‘place of birth’ rather than to ‘shared
culture’ when asked about their Irishness. Many, if not most, held the view
that Protestants are thus also Irish, whatever else they might say. Hardly any
of my informants ever mentioned ‘shared descent’ as a relevant criterion; to
the contrary, the vast majority objected to my explicit inquiries as to whether
one had to be of Irish descent (or Catholic) in order to be Irish, strongly
rejecting such positions as ‘racist’ (or ‘sectarian’). This might not be
representative of Irish Nationalists throughout the North, but within the
radicalised, considerably leftist, and strongly Republican heartland of Catho-
lic West Belfast, I experienced such statements as sufﬁciently ‘authentic’. In
short, reinterpreting this material in terms of ‘autochthony’, virtually all of my
informants can without much doubt be viewed as individualised autochthons.
With regard to their language activism, most Irish speakers also agreed in
seeing Irish as a crucial element of their own ‘Irish culture’ in need of revival.
Apart from those few articulating a ‘rights position’, all others seemed united
in a ‘cultural activism’ that explicitly aimed at reconstituting the cultural
distinctiveness of the Irish nation through reappropriating their ‘own native
language’. Despite sharing cultural activism, however, there was also con-
siderable internal dissent. Most importantly, ‘culturalists’ insisted on the strict
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separation between cultural language activism and political activism pushing 
for a united Ireland and unequivocally gave priority to the language cause. By 
contrast, ‘politicists’ insisted on the inseparably cultural as well as political 
nature of their Irish language activism. This discrepancy highlighted the 
conviction among culturalists that if the Irish language and the political cause 
of Ireland were ever to come into conﬂict, politicists would sell out the 
cultural cause of the language for the political goal of uniﬁcation. Further-
more, the conﬂict also revealed fears among culturalists that inverted those 
expressed by political activists in the 1909 National Convention: now, many 
culturalists in Catholic West Belfast feared that the politicists’ close associa-
tion of the Irish language with political activism would alienate Protestants 
hostile to Irish uniﬁcation from the potentially common cultural cause of the 
language revival.
In any case, these controversies between cultural and political activists in 
Catholic West Belfast have taken place against the backdrop of an astonish-
ingly uniform conception of an individualised-autochthon Irish nation. This 
implies, however, that the form activism takes is independent from the 
underlying variety of autochthony – an observation that goes against 
prototypical expectations raised by the civic–ethnic divide. What other factors 
determine the form activism takes, then?
I would argue that these determining factors are to be found in the political 
and cultural speciﬁcities of contexts that are experienced as ‘threats’ to the 
nation. In this sense, the most important context for locally heightening the 
awareness of Irish identity has been the Troubles, which broke out in 1969 
after the local civil rights movement met with violent reactions by Protestants 
and the state. Looking back, many locals told me that they had ‘always felt 
being Irish’. However, the Troubles brought a new sense of identity to the fore 
as locals increasingly came to understand the discrimination and violence they 
faced in terms of the oppression of ‘Irish’ people by agents of ‘British 
colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’. From such a perspective, an end to discrimi-
nation and violence could only be achieved by removing ‘the Brits’16 and 
uniting Ireland. Given the growing sense of their own Irishness, many local 
Catholics also started to engage with their own history and ‘Irish culture’. In 
this process, they were increasingly confronted with the contradiction between 
the high relevance of the Irish language in representations of Irishness and the 
low proﬁle of Irish in daily life. Many reacted to this inconsistency by 
changing their language practices; they started learning their ‘own native 
language’ and thereby became language activists. Apart from such forms of 
cultural activism, many locals also engaged in various types of political 
activism – be it as civil rights activists, street protesters, members of political 
parties, or as supporters of or volunteers in paramilitary organisations like the 
IRA.
To my mind, there are three context-speciﬁc reasons for this upsurge in 
political and especially cultural activism during the Troubles. At the collective 
level, a growing awareness among oppressed people of a national identity not
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yet fulﬁlled typically leads to nationalist movements, which – by deﬁnition –
attempt to (re)constitute political autonomy and cultural distinctiveness
(Smith 1991: 73–9). Within the speciﬁc Northern Irish conﬂict, accelerated
attempts to recreate a distinctive ‘Irish culture’ became particularly urgent,
given that centuries of enforced Anglicisation had increasingly prevented the
reproduction of a distinctive culture as the likely outcome of ‘shared place of
birth and/or residence’ within the individualised-autochthon Irish nation. In
addition and closely related to this, becoming a cultural activist also helped
many on a personal level to solve an identity crisis that resulted from a
heightened awareness of being Irish on the one hand, and a sense of cultural
self-alienation on the other. As Seosamh, a local Irish language activist in his
ﬁfties, succinctly put it (somewhat echoing Peadar):
On a personal level, and that’s just speaking about myself, it solves some problems to
be involved in activities that are very clearly identiﬁable markers. So that one solution
to a dilemma, ‘what does it mean to be Irish?’ – one possible solution to that dilemma is
to learn the language, and speak the language.17
Finally, the speciﬁc forms taken on by political and cultural activism,
beginning in the context of the Troubles, also mutually inﬂuenced each other.
In particular, the upsurge of political violence between the IRA and the
British state during the 1970s in the absence of effective peaceful political
activism drove many locals more towards the cultural rather than the political
end of Irishness. As Seosamh further explained during the same interview, he
could see no political activity that had anything to offer him and he ‘would
have felt uncomfortable not doing anything at all’; hence, he became ‘deeply
involved in the cultural issues’.18 In sum, the emergence of local cultural
language activism in Catholic West Belfast can be explained by the sense by
locals of the insufﬁcient cultural distinctiveness of the nation and a personal
desire for a more stable Irish identity (both against the backdrop of an
alienating Anglicisation) together with a lack of alternatives to the political
activism of violent conﬂict and not by an underlying type of autochthony.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued for the dissolution of the ambiguous and
overburdened concept of the civic–ethnic divide into several analytical
dimensions. I have proposed two such dimensions – ‘autochthony’ and
‘activism’ – as modest alternatives that focus on more narrowly deﬁned
aspects of the many facets of the nation. ‘Autochthony’ refers to the
speciﬁcally directed causal logic that underlies the (re)production of nation-
hood. In this sense, ‘autochthony’ entails a triad in which three components –
‘individual’, ‘territory’, and ‘group’ – are situated in time and causally linked
through place of birth/residence, membership with land rights, and shared
culture/descent. This dimension consists of a dichotomy in which ‘individua-
lised autochthony’ links the individual, territory, and group in such a way that
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shared culture and/or descent are likely to follow from place of birth and/or
residence, whereas ‘collectivised autochthony’ inverts this causality. The
second dimension – ‘activism’ – refers to activities that (re)constitute the
nation either as politically autonomous (‘political activism’) or as culturally
distinctive (‘cultural activism’).
Using the ethnographic case of contemporary Irish Nationalists in Catholic
West Belfast, I have shown that – in terms of the single civic–ethnic divide – these
actors could be depicted as both ‘civic’ nationalists and ‘ethno’-cultural revivalists.
However, this master dichotomy misleadingly equates ‘civic’ with ‘the political’
and ‘ethnic’ with ‘the cultural’. Categorising this empirical case in civic–ethnic
terms would hence not have sensitised the observer to the fact that that which
fundamentally ‘causes’ the nation (now in terms of autochthony) need not also be
‘the cause’ behind activism that aims at (re)constituting the nation in times of
crisis. In other words, as shown with regard to the largely cultural but also partly
political activism of individualised-autochthonous nationalists in Catholic West
Belfast, the type of activism is actually independent from the underlying form of
autochthony. It is instead dependent upon the political and cultural speciﬁcities of
the contexts that are experienced as ‘threatening’ the nation.
A ﬁnal note: it is obviously not impossible to observe such operations in
terms of the single civic–ethnic divide. Yet as I have tried to show, the task is
made much easier when various dichotomies are analytically distinguished
and ‘cross-tabulated’, rather than, by default, conﬂated in a single master
divide. Thus by providing a better heuristic, this article has further substan-
tiated the necessity of disambiguating the civic–ethnic distinction into several
analytical axes. This need is well served by focusing on the two dimensions
proposed in this article: ‘autochthony’ and ‘activism’.
Notes
1 In the politicised Northern Irish context, the use of words referring to the region is itself a 
matter of dispute, purportedly reﬂecting one’s own position on the conﬂict. Having used the label 
‘Northern Ireland’ in the title in order to unambiguously specify the polity at issue in this text, I 
subsequently use the terminology of my Irish Catholic Nationalist/Republican informants in 
Catholic West Belfast, who prefer terms such as ‘the North of Ireland,’ ‘the six counties’, or the
‘occupied counties’ to ‘Northern Ireland’ or ‘the province’.
2 In local discourse, the term ‘Republicanism’ refers to a more radicalised version of 
‘Nationalism,’ with both aspiring to unite Ireland. In contrast, ‘Loyalism’ constitutes a more 
radicalised form of ‘Unionism’, with both ﬁghting for the maintenance of the United Kingdom. 
Throughout this article, I use the small-letter version of ‘nationalism’ to refer to an overarching
analytical concept, while reserving the capitalised term ‘Nationalism’ for that strand among local 
nationalisms that aims for a united Ireland.
3 This ethnographic ﬁeldwork was conducted in the course of my Ph.D. research at the Max 
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany. Apart from participant observation
and informal interviews, my research produced an extensive series of in-depth interviews with a 
total of twenty-eight key informants. In order to insure a more representative sample, I selected 
interviewees with an eye towards age, gender, class, and degree of involvement in what is locally 
seen as ‘Irish culture’.
17
4 See especially Hindley (1990), Andrews (1997, 2000a, 2000b), Mac Po´ilin (1997, 2003a, 2003b,
2006), Mac Corraidh (2006), and De Bru´n (2006).
5 See especially Maguire (1991), Nig Uidhir (2006), McCoy (1997a, 1997b, 2006), Kachuk (1993,
1994) and O’Reilly (1996, 1997, 1999).
6 All names of informants have been anonymised.
7 Interview with Mary on 23 March 2004.
8 Interview with Robert on 5 February 2004.
9 Interview with Martina on 4 February 2004.
10 Interview with Daithi on 24 June 2004.
11 Interview with Peadar on 4 February 2004.
12 Interview with Sea´n on 2 April 2004.
13 This apparent ‘immediateness’ has been variously noted, for instance by the Comaroffs (2001:
648, 649, 651), who characterise autochthony as ‘a naturalising allegory of collective being-in-the-
world’, which in self-styling itself as ‘the most ‘authentic’, the most essential of all modes of
connection’, ‘natures the nation’. Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005: 385, 402) equally highlight the
‘apparently self-evident’ nature and ‘naturalness’ of autochthony claims, while Geschiere and
Jackson (2006: 6) speak of autochthony as putatively based ‘on some sort of primordial truth-
claim about belonging to the land’.
14 So far, autochthony research in Africa has primarily focused on Cameroon (Geschiere 2004;
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000; Konings and Nyamnjoh 2003; Leonhardt 2006; Socpa 2006);
Ivory Coast (Chauveau 2006; Dozon 2000; Marshall-Fratani 2006), Eastern Congo (Jackson
2006), the Black Volta region (Lentz 2003, 2006a, 2006b), and South Africa (Comaroff and
Comaroff 2001; Landau 2006). In Europe, Belgian Flanders has been studied in much detail
(Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005: 397–402; Ceuppens 2006).
15 Jackson (2006: 100–9) is most explicit in this regard, equating ‘ethnicity’ with the local,
‘nationality’ with the national (sic), i.e. with the state, and ‘megaethnicity’ with the regional level
in his study on autochthony discourses in Eastern Congo.
16 In the course of arguing that local Protestants are actually also Irish, several of my Catholic
informants also emphasised that the Republican usage of the phrase ‘Brits out’ had been
unfortunate throughout the Troubles. This was so, they argued, because for Republicans the
phrase meant, of course, only the British Army and the British State (as Protestants were seen as
being Irish anyway). However, from the point of view of most Protestants, this slogan was seen as
a direct threat to their right to stay in Ireland.
17 Interview with Seosamh on 14 July 2004.
18 Interview with Seosamh on 14 July 2004.
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Postscript
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Department of European Studies, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Types and typologies
Nationalism comes in different types and ﬂavours, and the case of Northern 
Ireland proves how these can coexist in a densely packed manner and how 
easily they mutate in a small high-pressure situation. Memories in the North 
go back a long way – the 1641 Rebellion and the 1688 Glorious Revolution 
are of undiminished topicality among loyalists, while nationalists invoke 
‘eight centuries of British rule’ as an undigested experience. Yet, as is the 
nature of memories, they fail to see that the past is also, as the phrase goes, a 
different country. Nationalism is ﬁrmly in the present and hot on the past, but 
lukewarm when it comes to actual history, the record of how things change, 
morph and adapt in a changing world.
Nationalist movements and their actors typically invoke memories that are 
equally remarkable for their time-depth, their anachronistic tendency and 
their selective partiality. For that reason alone, any attempt at devising a 
typology of nationalism should ensure that a proper sense of diachronic 
variability is factored into the analysis, and that one uses this diachrony to 
double-check nationalists’ subjectivity: their own self-estimates, self-images 
and self-projections. These, after all, are at best perspectivally coloured and at 
worst a rhetorical smoke screen for unstated hidden agendas or mixed 
feelings.
Olaf Zenker’s article very rightly points out that ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ stances 
are the warp and the woof of a single discourse (and, he infers, attitude) 
among Catholic Belfast language activists; both are subsumed under the 
notion of ‘autochthony’. His critique of a rigid analytical and oppositional 
distinction between these two types is well taken, although perhaps a little 
overstated. As Zenker himself acknowledges, few scholars nowadays actually 
use the contrast as an analytical divider between two distinct types of 
nationalism (as in, for instance, diesel engines vs. petrol engines), and most 
see it as a ‘ﬂavour’ which only becomes meaningful in combination with other 
analytical criteria. As such (comparable to, say, the pH degree of acidity in a 
chemical compound) the differentiation still appears heuristically useful to 
me, if only for the fact that the discourse of nationalism itself (not just the 
analytical lens of the contemporary scholar) has the duality between ethnos 
and demos, between a shared-culture-based or a social-contract-based under-
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standing of the nation, deeply embedded within its very ﬁbre. This ambiva-
lence in the concept of the nation – as those sharing a past (a cultural
inheritance), or as those sharing a present (a society, economy and territory) –
has been at the core of nationalism in all its changing historical manifesta-
tions, certainly in Europe, from the days of Herder and Rousseau onwards,
and it would be unwise to dismiss its existence and operative presence. Indeed
nationalism may be deﬁned as precisely that ideology that conﬂates ethnos
and demos. When the Parisian Jacobins in 1792 declared their Republic to be
franc¸aise, une et indivisible in one and the same phrase, and went on to
emancipate its Jews and to proscribe its patois in one and the same gesture,
they did precisely that; when Fichte and Arndt deﬁned a German identity as
an inherited, transgenerational bond of continuity between ancestors and
contemporaries, and went on to deﬁne Germany as that territory so weit die
deutsche Zunge klingt; they did precisely that. Nationalism, in one plausible
deﬁnition among many others, is the geopolitical application of cultural self-
awareness (at least in Europe). Civic and ethnic are the two legs on which it
walks.
The history of national movements is often the history of a shifting pH
degree of acidity on a sliding ethnic-civic scale. Zenker offers a very interesting
empirical case study on the dynamic interaction between these ﬂavours in
present-day West Belfast, and his identiﬁcation of a feedback loop between
the identiﬁcations with territory and group culture (‘autochthony’) is convin-
cing and insightful. But his strict typological distinction between ‘individua-
lised’ and ‘collectivised’ autochthony seems to let the civic-ethnic distinction,
so very ﬁrmly kicked out the window, back in through the back door. The
former is here deﬁned as seeing fellow-group members as sharing ‘respective
presents’; the latter as working by way of ‘the passe´ simple of groups’.
How does that distinction differ from, and improve upon, the impugned
one between civic and ethnic types of nationalism? Partly, I suspect, by
representing the civic-ethnic distinction in overpolarised terms, as a man-
ichean dilemma. The ‘civic’ aspect of nationalism is reduced to the purely
geographical notion of territoriality (‘place of birth’, excluding the broader
social dimension that is ﬁrmly part of civic nationalism), while simultaneously
the ‘ethnic’ aspect of nationalism is reduced to the purely biological sense of
‘shared descent’ (likewise excluding the broader social dimension of transge-
nerationally transmitted or retrospectively appropriated culture: memories or
historical myths, for instance). No wonder that no one, when queried in those
stark terms, will want to admit to anything else than a civic-territorial loyalty;
all the rest falls under the shadow of ethnic essentialism. And no wonder,
subsequently, that all those who were thus corralled into the territorialist
camp turn out later to have culturalist opinions as well. ‘Autochthony’ thus
becomes the way out of a dilemma created by overstating the civic-ethnic
opposition.
The case study in hand is about actors subjectively applying a concept of
nationality to themselves. What we are dealing with here is not nationality or
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E´nationalism per se, but the way it is represented and explained. That the 
author during his ﬁeldwork ‘experienced such statements as authentic’ speaks 
for their representativity but does not prove their objective applicability as 
analytical operands.
The self-reﬂecting discourse of activists is representative, ﬁrst and fore-
most, of their own self-positioning; that is to say, of a precise, speciﬁc juncture 
in the historical development of Irish (or Northern Irish) nationalism. Such 
discourse must be measured, not only against the history of Ireland or the 
taxonomy of sub-types of nationalism in general, but ﬁrst and foremost 
against the history of Irish nationalism – and a history that is more recent, and 
more present in the informants’ minds, than the 1909 analogy adduced here. 
In the history of Northern Irish nationalism, a much-debated, well-documen-
ted generational shift took place in the 1970s, usually linked to the internment 
period of certain young Sinn Fe´ in/IRA activists (Gerry Adams among them), 
who then formed the think tank of a new paradigm.
Many Northern Irish Catholics had around 1970 been inspired by Martin 
Luther King and his Civil Rights campaign; the IRA politicos radicalised this 
into a Popular Liberation Front ideology more indebted to Che Guevara and 
Ho Chi Minh. Both moves swept aside (not without bitter transitional 
conﬂicts) an older paradigm represented by canonical ﬁgures such as John 
Mitchel and Patrick Pearse. That type of traditionalist, nativist nationalism, 
characterised by (a) its ingrained invocation of Ireland’s Gaelic roots and 
culture as the country’s strongest title for national separateness and its right to 
self-determination, and (b) by its moral conservatism and introspective 
isolationism, was abandoned for a new progressivism (witness Sinn Fe´ in’s
ire Nua programme as adopted in the mid-1970s) almost at the same time 
that it also lost its dominance in the Republic (after the 1966 commemoration 
of the Easter Rising).
This paradigm shift has taken place within living memory, and the rejection 
of backward-looking, introspective and xenophobic traditionalism among 
Irish nationalists is still fresh and active. What persists, across this paradigm 
shift, is an intense anti-Britishness and an ongoing commitment to Gaelic 
cultural activism such as language revivalism. Only the ‘Ofﬁcial’ Sinn Fe´ in/
IRA took the logic of this shift to its full conclusion and dropped all 
culturalism in its stance, becoming a neo-Marxist ‘Workers’ Party’. They 
were rapidly sidelined: all other Catholic parties and activists continued to see 
the Northern Irish conﬂict in national rather than colonial or class terms, and 
continued to identify their position in that conﬂict by an ongoing invocation 
of inherited historical myths and memories; the more militant factions more 
strenuously so than the less militant ones.
Each national movement needs its Signiﬁcant Other. For the nationalist 
community in the North of Ireland, that Other was, until the late 1960s, 
primarily the Stormont regime. After 1970 it became primarily the British 
government and Crown forces. That shift alone would entail a shift in 
emphasis away from culture (primary distinguishing feature vis-a` -vis Protes-
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tant Unionists) towards territoriality (primary distinguishing feature vis-a`-vis
Mainland Britain).
In this light, the singularity that Zenker rightly draws attention to becomes
truly fascinating, crucial even: the fact that Gaelic-language education in West
Belfast arose more or less conjointly with the IRA’s move away from old-
school Mitchel/Pearse-style nationalism. This is indeed intriguing; one may
link it to the 1970s revival of subaltern minority cultures, also in evidence in
Wales, Brittany and elsewhere, and the baby-boom generation’s adoption of
folk tradition as countercultural; in any case, it represents an assertion of Irish
separateness from the British polity.
Cultural and political assertions of the non-Britishness of Ireland are both
of them abiding and intrinsic parts of Irish nationalism, and are both of them
involved in the shifting processes of self-positioning that go on in national
movements, weighted and foregrounded in different gradations according to
historical circumstance and individual proclivity.
All this needs to be taken into account when questioning Northern Irish
informants, who, in any case, are deeply steeped in that habitus which we
know from Seamus Heaney’s line: ‘Whatever you say, say nothing’. Gerry
Adams will, in the teeth of all evidence, appearances or common-sense logic,
refuse to admit that he has ever been involved in, let alone responsible for, any
act of IRA violence. Nor will Sinn Fe´in as a political party ever explicitly
admit to having institutional ties with the IRA. Nor will many nationalists
nowadays admit to ethnic essentialism.
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Reply
OLAF ZENKER
Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Bern, Switzerland
I am grateful to Joep Leerssen for his insightful comments and additional
historical contextualisation. As a matter of fact, I agree with many of his
observations and do not necessarily see them as contradicting my argumenta-
tion. However, Leerssen’s reply does identify a number of points that are
apparently in need of further clariﬁcation if only to establish where we do
actually differ. To begin with, the reason to follow Rogers Brubaker and
others in arguing for the necessity of replacing the civic-ethnic divide with
several analytical dimensions consists in the observation that this master
dichotomy is analytically and normatively ambiguous and unduly conﬂates
various facets of the complex phenomenon of nationalism that are better
analysed separately. The ideal-typical nature of this dichotomy is not really
the problem here; hence, I do not conceive my ideal-typical usage of
autochthony and activism, including my distinction between individualised
and collectivised autochthony, as such as a problem: empirical cases often
combine elements of individualised and collectivised autochthony – for
instance, consider legislation on Irish citizenship (especially after 2004) –
and can be proﬁtably described by such ideal-types.
Second, Leerssen rightly points out that the discourse of nationalism
typically conﬂates ‘ethnos’ and ‘demos’ (i.e. notions of sharing an ancestral
and/or cultural ‘ethnic’ past as well as sharing a present socio-economic
demos of common territoriality) and that nationalism can thus be deﬁned as
‘the geopolitical application of cultural [and/or descent-related] self-aware-
ness.’ In fact, I start from that very assumption myself and then attempt to
specify the ways in which the causal relationship between these two sides of the
nationalist coin can be further conceptualised: Is the nation ideal-typically
seen as rooted in notions of shared descent and/or shared culture (i.e. not only
in the purely biological sense of descent, as Leerssen purports my argument to
be), which then get(s) geopolitically applied? Or is the nation conceived of as a
geopolitically circumscribed community that over time ends up with a
common culture and/or common descent? For many people, this question is
truly academic precisely because both ideal-typical causal logics seem to lead
to the same result. However, in cases of ‘classiﬁcatory anomaly’ these issues
do matter. From the perspective of many Irish Catholics in West Belfast, local
Protestants in Northern Ireland constitute such a classiﬁcatory anomaly, in
sharing with Catholics their place of birth – namely, ‘the one and only Ireland’
– while differing from what is locally conceived as distinctive Irish culture.
The fact that many Irish Catholics ultimately insist on the Irishness of
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Protestants, to my mind, justiﬁes an interpretation in terms of individualised
autochthony that sets place of birth at the beginning of a causal chain that is
seen as only possibly leading to common Irish culture (and/or descent). In
sum, instead of denying the coexistence of geopolitical and cultural as well as
descent-related elements within nationalism, I attempt to provide a more
nuanced understanding of how exactly these ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ elements are
seen by social actors themselves as causally interacting with each other.
This leads to a third issue, namely, to the possible improvement of such an
approach to the familiar civic-ethnic divide. To my mind, the notion of
autochthony as proposed in my article and herein offers an ideal-typical
model of inverse causalities, as seen by the actors involved, in bringing about
speciﬁc empirical combinations of ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ elements, which the
civic-ethnic divide merely registers. This, in conjunction with the second
analytical dimension of activism, makes for a more nuanced approach that
simply makes it easier to observe the speciﬁcities of this ‘very interesting
empirical case study’.
Fourth, turning towards the methodological subtext of Leerssen’s com-
ments, it should be emphasised that I did not begin my research with a pre-
existing hypothesis consisting of this model of autochthony to be merely
tested or ‘proved’ empirically, whatever the cost. I also did not ‘query’ my
informants in any stark or mutually exclusive terms of ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’
nationalism, as Leerssen seems to suggest. On the contrary, I simply
continued to be puzzled after numerous, extensive, repeated and quite varied
contacts with a group of informants over a period of fourteen months of
ﬁeldwork about the apparent contradiction between their explicit insistence
that in order to be truly Irish, they felt they had to learn and speak their ‘own
native language’, while simultaneously insisting that a shared place of birth
was ultimately all that was truly needed to be(come) Irish. My proposed
model of autochthony is the result of my attempts to get closer to an
explanation – developed at book length in my PhD thesis – of how these
apparently contradictory elements ﬁt together in my informants’ approaches
to their sense of Irishness. The point is thus not so much that, obviously, my
informants had ‘territorialist’ as well as ‘culturalist opinions’, as Leerssen
notes, but rather that these quite speciﬁc ideas, catalysing my informants’
activist practices, seemed to be utterly self-contradictory. It is true that this
coexistence of elements can indeed be described in terms of the civic-ethnic
divide, as I myself note in the article, yet I think that one might more easily
reach a deeper understanding of local dynamics by using the proposed two
dimensions of autochthony and activism.
Last but not least, Leerssen’s suggestive but erroneous conjectures regard-
ing my encounters with West Belfast Catholics are based on the widespread
assumption that territorial/‘civic’ inclusivity is generally seen as positive and
hence over-communicated by all politically versed actors, whereas cultural
and/or descent-related/‘ethnic’ exclusivity is seen as negative and hence is
strategically under-communicated by such actors. Rogers Brubaker eloquently
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shows in the text quoted in the article that this is not necessarily the case. For the
Northern Irish situation since the Peace Process of the 1990s, public discourse
has shifted from a de facto exclusion of Irishness from the public sphere to a new
rhetoric, explicitly valuing a ‘parity of esteem’ between ‘the two cultural
traditions’. Under these conditions, it has turned into a politically beneﬁcial
strategy for Irish Republicans to suddenly publicly emphasise (as they have
indeed started doing) that Protestants have every right to see themselves as
British if they wish. In other words, contrary to Leerssen’s assumption, a
discourse of ‘ethno’-cultural exclusion (whether or not essentialist), which
separates Irish Catholics and British Protestants, has emerged as the politically
correct view to espouse in public, rather than a discourse of ‘civic-territorial
loyalty’ and inclusion. Thus, contrary to Leerssen’s assumption, my interlocu-
tors did not usually stress territorial inclusion of Protestants under the label of
common Irishness but instead typically ﬁrst emphasised that Protestants right-
fully saw themselves as British. It was only when I succeeded, over time, in
getting them to talk about their own perceptions of Protestants that many of my
Catholic informants came out insisting that they actually still saw local
Protestants as also being Irish. At the risk of taking Seamus Heaney’s unguarded
candour too literally, to my mind it is therefore Catholics’ publicly propagated
‘ethno’-cultural essentialisation of Protestants’ cultural Britishness in the wake
of the two-cultural-traditions-shibboleth, rather than their backgrounded dis-
course of inclusive Irishness based on common place of birth, that needs to be
viewed with suspicion and accordingly handled with care.
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